

An Anti-logophoric Demonstrative: French *ce*

1. Nominal-restriction and anti-referentiality. In French, the neuter demonstrative *ce* can be used as a pre-copular element, together with a post-copular (in)definite description, to seemingly refer to a thing or a person:

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| <p>(1) <i>Speaking of Pierre...</i>
 <i>C'est un écrivain.</i>
 CE-is a writer
 'He's a writer.'</p> | <p>(2) <i>Speaking of this store...</i>
 <i>C'est une épicerie.</i>
 CE-is a grocery-store
 'It's a grocery store.'</p> |
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Only a nominal expression can be used in this frame (but bare NPs are excluded):

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| <p>(3) <i>Speaking of Pierre...</i>
 a. #C'est poli. (CE is polite)
 b. #C'est écrivain. (CE is writer)</p> | <p>(4) <i>Speaking of this car...</i>
 #C'est rapide. (CE is fast)</p> |
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A natural hypothesis about (1)-(2), in view of their difference with (3)-(4), is that they are or can be specificational sentences, i.e. statements of identity between two DP denotations (Higgins 1979). But can the denotation of *ce* in (1)-(2) be of just any of the types available to DPs? From the deviance of the strictly predicational structures in (3)-(4), where the post-copular element is or can be $\langle e, t \rangle$, we can conclude that *ce* is subject to an **anti-referentiality** constraint, i.e. it cannot have a denotation of type *e* (in fact, one can show that it can have a denotation of type *v* or *s*, e.g. activities, states or situations).

2. Inanimacy and anti-logophoricity. But then what is the denotation of *ce* in (1)-(2)? And are these sentences necessarily specificational? The following setup, with a relative clause modifying the post-copular DP of sentences like (1)-(2), is designed to answer these questions:

- (5) $\underbrace{\text{CE copula DP}}_{=(1)/(2)}$, which $\underbrace{\text{CE copula } t \dots}_{\text{Predicational copular sentence}}$

In this frame, *ce* appears twice as the subject of a copular sentence and it is intended to 'refer' to the same thing in both cases. The second occurrence is in an appositive relative clause, in order to ensure that the second copula is predicative, as relativization of the post-copular phrase is known (at least since Longobardi 1985) to only be licit in predicational sentences:

- (6) *You should talk to Beverly, who the best pie-maker around here is. (Mikkelsen 2004)
 Let's flesh out the template in (5) (*ce* in *ce que* is irrelevant):

- (7) *Speaking of this store...*
C'est une épicerie, ce que c'est depuis toujours.
 CE-is a grocery-store which CE-is since always
 '[This shop] is a grocery store, which it has always been.'
- (8) *Speaking of Pierre/the director...*
 #*C'est un écrivain, ce que c'est depuis toujours.*
 CE-is a writer which CE-is since always
 Intended: '[Pierre/The director] is a writer, which he has always been.'
 Inference triggered: Pierre/the director is inanimate.

In (7) and (8), I observe that the 'referent' of *ce* has to be inanimate (which leads to deviance in the latter). We know that the *ce* in the relative cannot have an extension of type *e* (cf. (3)-(4)), therefore I submit that its extension is an individual concept $\langle s, e \rangle$, which serves as the argument of a predicate of type $\langle \langle s, e \rangle, t \rangle$. Furthermore, an **inanimacy presupposition** is attached to this extension of *ce* and to any extension of it that fits a **predicational** frame. The type $\langle \langle s, e \rangle, t \rangle$ must also be the type of the matrix DP, by virtue of relativization. Here's an analysis of (8):

- (9) CE est un écrivain $\langle \langle s, e \rangle, t \rangle$, ce que $\underbrace{\text{CE}_{\langle s, e \rangle} \text{ est } t_{\langle \langle s, e \rangle, t \rangle} \dots}_{\text{Predicational copular sentence}}$ (=8)

From this we can draw the following conclusions about (1), which has an animate apparent ‘referent’: it is not predicational, otherwise an inanimacy presupposition would be triggered, so it is an identity statement, which explains the DP restriction; the post-copular DP is $\langle\langle s, e \rangle, t\rangle$, i.e. it denotes a set of individual concepts, and $\llbracket ce \rrbracket$ is of the same $\langle\langle s, e \rangle, t\rangle$ type (thus not an individual concept, contra Moltmann 2010): ‘ $CE_{\langle\langle s, e \rangle, t\rangle}$ est un écrivain $_{\langle\langle s, e \rangle, t\rangle}$ ’. Regarding (2), the facts are compatible with an ambiguity between a predicational (with an inanimacy inference) and a specificational construal. An additional restriction bears on *ce* in (1), namely **anti-logophoricity**. As with epithets, e.g. *the bastard*, disjoint reference effects obtain between a logophoric SOURCE or SELF and pre-copular *ce*: c-command is not required to cause the effect, and it is also not sufficient, as the effect is obviated in relative clauses or under *convaincre* ‘convince’, where the logophoric center is the object of the attitude verb (Patel-Grosz 2012):

(10) *Pierre_i / [Chaque candidat]_i pense que c’_{#i,j} est un génie.*

Pierre/ each candidate thinks that CE is a genius
‘Pierre_i/Each candidate_i thinks that he_{#i,j} is a genius.’

(11) *Pierre_i / [Chaque candidat]_i a convaincu Marie que c’_{i,j} est un génie.*

Pierre/ each candidate has convinced Marie that CE is a genius

We can discard a possible analysis of (1) in terms of truncated clefts (after all, *ce* is used in clefts): no anti-logophoricity effect arises in clefts:

(12) *Pierre_i / [Chaque candidat]_i pense que c’est un génie qu’ il_i est.*

Pierre/ each candidate thinks that it-is a genius that he is

3. Analysis. The post-copular DPs in ‘identity-*ce*’ sentences (1) can denote sorts, i.e. sets of individual concepts (here I take inspiration from Heller&Wolter 2008, without the strong identity condition attached to ‘quiddity predicates’; only nominals can denote sorts, cf. *wood* vs. *wooden*; for post-copular names and pronouns, which are also possible in frame (1), with the same anti-logophoricity effect as in (10), I explore the possibility that these can be analyzed as definite descriptions as well). Given identity, $\langle\langle s, e \rangle, t\rangle$ is also the type of $\llbracket ce \rrbracket$ in (1). Quantifier binding (11) suggests the presence of a null pronoun which serves as argument to the demonstrative. This pronoun denotes the *index* (Elbourne 2008) i.e. the contextually salient entity which is the object of the deixis. I propose the following entry (13) for *ce* in ‘identity-*ce*’ sentences (another entry, not shown here, is necessary for the cases where $\llbracket ce \rrbracket$ is $\langle s, e \rangle$; *ce* then combines with a silent THING, hence the inanimacy inference (second occurrence in (8)):

(13) $\llbracket ce \rrbracket^{w,t} = \lambda y_e. \lambda S_{\langle\langle se, t \rangle, t\rangle}. \lambda x_e. \iota f_{\langle se, t \rangle} [S(f)=T \ \& \ (\lambda w'_s. y) \text{ is } f \text{ in } w \ \& \ \text{distal}(x, y, w, t)=T]$

(14) $\llbracket \llbracket [CE \ i_2] \text{ SORT} \rrbracket \text{ pro}_3 \rrbracket \text{ est un écrivain} \rrbracket^{w,t} \rightsquigarrow \text{The sort that Pierre is is writer}$

The value of i_2 is what the demonstrative points at, the *index*, e.g. Pierre (for simplicity, a relation argument, present in Elbourne 2008, is suppressed); this pronoun can be bound by a quantifier; SORT is a $\langle\langle se, t \rangle, t\rangle$ constant (the set of all sorts); the third argument is an individual variable (not part of Elbourne’s analysis of English demonstratives), which ends up being bound to the speaker, or the subject of an attitude predicate: this is the pronoun which, following Percus&Sauerland 2003 a.o., is identified with the matrix subject’s belief self in a *De Se* LF. Anti-logophoricity results from the preference for a *De Se* construal (*Prefer De Se!*, Schlenker 2005), combined with the distance component: the distance feature of demonstratives is evaluated w.r.t. a center, which **can be an attitude subject** (Elbourne 2008 p. 432). It is actually immaterial whether we choose DISTAL or PROXIMAL (the features used to distinguish *this* and *that*), as long as there is some distance between the *index* (y) and the individual that the subject identifies with (x) (as required by ‘ $\text{distal}(x, y, w, t)$ ’). Assuming that distance entails non-identity, we get a contradiction when the *index* is set to be the subject of an attitude, in a *De Se* LF (remember the preference for *De Se*): anti-logophoricity ensues (10).